Research

My main research interests are in the metaphysics of science, and the philosophy of mind. My current interest in metaphysics of science is primarily concerned with the issue of how to make sense of the autonomy of the special sciences (e.g. chemistry, biology, and psychology) from physics, and am currently developing an account of downward causation based on the idea that spacetime symmetries act as constraints on the dynamical laws. My latest research on this topic concerns the problem of “spacetime feelers”: how can spacetime constrain if its occupants can’t tell where they are? I aim to publish something on this topic shortly. In the philosophy of mind, I am currently working on developing versions of representationalism about consciousness based on theories of neural representation. (Pssst: I’m not really doing philosophy of mind at the moment, but will return to it once I get everything else sorted out.)

These projects are part of a broader emergentism about the special sciences. I think that emergence is best construed positively (e.g. in terms of causal or qualitative novelty) rather than negatively (e.g. in terms of non-deducibility, be it in principle or in practice). I think that if it’s construed positively, emergence is consistent with physical realization, and is a plausible and non-mysterious way in which to think about special science autonomy. I also have research interests in modality (specifically powers-based accounts), and epistemology. For more information, see my publications. For details of my past FCT-funded project, see EITNS, and for news of project events and talks, with podcasts (eventually), see events.

Jerry Fodor once memorably said: “I expect to figure out why there is anything except physics the day before I figure out why there is anything at all, another (and presumably related) metaphysical conundrum that I find perplexing.” Much of my research in metaphysics is basically me trying to work out an answer to this question. I hope to publish a book on the subject at some point, unless it turns out that Fodor was right, and the question doesn’t really have an answer.

If you’d like to collaborate on these or other areas of common philosophical interest, please get in touch! (Pssst: if your email is too long, too boring, too critical, not critical enough, or arrives at the weekend, I will probably not reply to it. I will, however, flag it for follow up.)